Idaho Supreme Court Rejects “Baseball Rule” in Case Seeking Damages for Injury from a Foul Ball

The Supreme Court of Idaho has rejected a minor league baseball team’s argument that the “Baseball Rule” limited its duty to spectators hit by foul balls.   

The Case

Bud Rountree was struck by a baseball while attending a minor league baseball game and, as a result, lost an eye. He sued the team and a number of defendants, alleging that their negligence had caused his injuries. The team moved for summary judgment, arguing that the trial court should adopt the “Baseball Rule,” which limited the duty of stadium operators to spectators hit by foul balls, and find that it had complied with it. The trial court ruled against the team, and the dispute reached the ultimate umpire in Idaho:  the Idaho Supreme Court.

The Idaho Supreme Court Decision

The Idaho Supreme Court held that the Baseball Rule did not apply in Idaho. It found no link between baseball and spectator injuries and noted that the team had admitted that at least for seven seasons, Rountree’s accident was the only time a spectator has suffered a “major” injury because of a foul ball at its stadium.  In the court’s opinion, the rarity of these incidents weighed against crafting a special rule.

Moreover, the court continued, the team had not provided any broader statistical evidence regarding the prevalence of foul ball injuries in general, and – assuming they were so prevalent – how varying stadium designs might prevent them. The court found that without this information, drawing lines as to where a stadium owner’s duty began, where netting should be placed, and so on, became “guesswork.”  These kinds of questions, the court concluded, were appropriate for the legislature because it had the resources for the research, study, and proper formulation of broad public policy.

The case is Rountree v. Boise Baseball, LLC, No. 38966 (Idaho Feb. 22, 2013).

The Rivkin Rule

A majority of the jurisdictions that have considered the issue have adopted some variation of the Baseball Rule. See, e.g., Arnold v. City of Cedar Rapids, 443 N.W.2d 332 (Iowa 1989); Anderson v. Kansas City Baseball Club, 231 S.W.2d 170 (Mo. 1950); Akins v. Glens Falls City Sch. Dist., 53 N.Y.2d 325 (N.Y. 1981); Cincinnati Baseball Club Co. v. Eno, 147 N.E. 86 (Ohio 1925); Lawson ex rel. Lawson v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 901 P.2d 1013 (Utah 1995).

Although many variations exist, the most common formulation of the Baseball Rule is that stadium owners and operators must provide screened seats for as many spectators as may be reasonably expected to call for them on any ordinary occasion. The rationale behind this was explained by the Eno court, which stated that it was “common knowledge that in baseball games hard balls are thrown and batted with great swiftness” and “they are liable to be thrown or batted outside the lines of the diamond.” The Eno court therefore concluded that “due care on the part on the management does not require all of the spectators to be screened in; that the management performs its duty toward the spectators when it provides screened seats in the grand stand and gives spectators the opportunity of occupying them.”

The second most common variation, applied in approximately nine jurisdictions, is quite similar: that stadium owners and operators have a duty to provide “a choice between a screened[-]in and an open seat” for spectators who desire the protection. See, e.g., Lorino v. New Orleans Baseball & Amusement Co., 133 So. 408 (La. App. 1931).

It also should be noted that a number of legislatures have adopted variations of the Baseball Rule. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-554; Colo Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-21-120 (1994); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-43 to 2A:53A-48; 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 38/10.