NJ Supreme Court Bars Sexual Relationships with Clients

July 30, 2026 | Ana Parikh | Rebecca Yin | Professional Liability

On July 23, 2026, the New Jersey Supreme Court approved the addition of Rule 1.8(k) to New Jersey’s Rules of Professional Conduct, effective September 1, 2026. The new rule, which adopts and clarifies ABA Model Rule 1.8(j), creates a new conflict-of-interest rule prohibiting attorneys from having sexual relations with their clients unless a consensual relationship already existed between the attorney and the client when the representation began. When the client is an organization or entity, the rule bars attorneys from engaging in such relations with members of the organization’s litigation control group, i.e., the officers or employees of the organization who are responsible for or significantly involved in determining the organization’s legal position in a given matter. For the purposes of the rule, the term “lawyer” includes only the attorneys who assist with the representation of the client.

The change marks a reversal from the Court’s prior rejection of Model Rule 1.8(j) and the ad hoc analysis currently employed in evaluating such relationships. Under the current disciplinary framework, an attorney’s sexual relationship with a client is not per se unethical, but will be grounds for discipline if, under the circumstances, the attorney is found to have taken advantage of the client or otherwise violated existing Rules of Professional Conduct. For example, in the seminal case on the issue, In re Leibowitz, 104 N.J. 175 (1985), the Court disciplined an attorney for initiating a sexual encounter with his indigent client after finding that, under the circumstances, the attorney was in a position of dominance because the client could reasonably have inferred that rejecting his advances would adversely affect her legal representation. Moreover, because the attorney had been assigned to represent the client through an official judiciary program, the attorney’s conduct was found to be prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of the predecessor rule to RPC 8.4.

In recent years, attorneys who engaged in improper personal relationships with their clients have been disciplined based on violations of RPC 1.7(a)(2)—on the theory that the improper relationship created a significant risk that the lawyer’s representation would be materially limited by their personal interests—as well as RPC 1.16(a)(1), which requires attorneys to withdraw from a representation if continuing such representation would result in a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. In keeping with Liebowitz, the improper relationship is also often found to violate RPC 8.4(d) as well, if the attorney is a public defender or otherwise appointed to the representation by the court.

Even so, the inquiry is decidedly fact-sensitive, with the outcome wholly dependent on whether there is evidence that the attorney engaged in “opportunistic misconduct,” caused injury to the judicial system, or violated another RPC. In re Liebowitz, 104 N.J. at 180. Most recently, the Court suspended an attorney for violating RPC 1.7(a)(2) and RPC 1.16(a)(1) after the attorney initiated and continued a sexual relationship with a client for over a year while the representation was ongoing. Although the relationship was consensual, the attorney knew the client suffered from mental health challenges that made her especially vulnerable to manipulation, and instead of withdrawing or referring the client to any of the numerous attorneys at his firm who were capable of taking on the representation, the attorney took advantage of her vulnerability to convince her to continue his representation and the relationship. In re Mourtos, 256 N.J. 500 (2024).

With the adoption of RPC 1.8(k), a client’s subjective vulnerability to exploitation is no longer a factor in determining whether an attorney’s sexual relationship with their client is unethical. Instead, such relationships with clients will be deemed categorically improper, even if the client initiates the relationship or encourages the attorney to do so, and attorneys should therefore refrain from initiating such relationships with clients under any circumstances while the representation remains ongoing.

That said, the rule makes clear that the restriction applies only to attorneys who are actually involved with the client’s representation; in cases where a client is represented by a law firm, the rule does not prohibit another attorney employed by the firm from beginning a relationship with the client as long as the attorney is not involved in the firm’s representation of that client. In a similar vein, if the handling attorney at a firm becomes affected by a conflict of interest under the new RPC 1.8(k), other unaffected attorneys in the firm may continue the representation. Furthermore, it appears that in the case of organizational clients, the rule would not prohibit relations between attorneys—even those directly involved in the representation—and individuals outside of the organization’s litigation control group. Attorneys also remain able to represent their spouses, romantic partners, or other individuals with whom they already have an established consensual sexual relationship.

In adopting Rule 1.8(k), New Jersey joins the ranks of the 40 other states that have codified some form of prohibition against sexual relations between a client and an attorney. The remaining nine states that have yet to explicitly ban such relationships are Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.

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