Employee Loses Religious Discrimination Suit

April 30, 2010 | Appeals | Insurance Coverage

In September 2007, Triumph Apparel Corporation fired the plaintiff after approximately one year of employment after she refused either to accept part-time employment or to remain at work until 3:00 p.m. on Fridays. Asserting that Triumph had refused to accommodate her religious observance of the Jewish Sabbath, the plaintiff sued for employment discrimination on the basis of religion under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Following a bench trial, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument and entered judgment for Triumph.

As the court explained, to make out a prima facie claim of religious discrimination, a plaintiff must show that he or she (1) held a bona fide religious belief conflicting with an employment requirement; (2) informed his or her employer of this belief; and (3) were disciplined for failure to comply with the conflicting employment requirement. Once a plaintiff established a prima facie case, the employer must offer the plaintiff a reasonable accommodation, unless doing so would cause the employer to suffer an undue hardship. An accommodation was not reasonable, the court added, if it did not eliminate the conflict between the employment requirement and the religious practice. An accommodation might be unreasonable if it caused an employee an inexplicable diminution in his or her employee status or benefits.

In this case, the court ruled, the plaintiff had failed to carry her burden of establishing a prima facie claim of religious discrimination. The court stated that although the plaintiff had demonstrated that she sincerely believed that she could neither work nor travel during the Jewish Sabbath, which lasts from sundown on Friday through sundown on Saturday, she had not shown that she sincerely believed that she needed to leave her New York City office before 3:00 p.m. on Fridays to observe her religion. The court pointed out that the testimony established that the plaintiff could have followed each practice and custom she identified as necessary to the observance of her religion by commuting to either her New Jersey apartment or her Pennsylvania home depending on the time of sunset. According to the court, for the summer months (when Triumph closed at 1:00 p.m.) and many other weeks of the year when sundown came after 6:00 p.m., the plaintiff had sufficient time to commute to her Pennsylvania home; the remainder of the year she had more than enough time to travel to her New Jersey apartment. Because the plaintiff never explained to her employer that she was living in Pennsylvania and needed three hours to commute to Pennsylvania each Friday, the court found that the plaintiff failed to advise her employer that her preferred manner of practicing her religion required her to leave work three hours before sundown on Fridays. The court added that the plaintiff, having chosen to conceal from her employer that she was commuting to Pennsylvania, invented the explanation that she needed the extra time on Fridays to go to the kosher butcher and to prepare herself mentally for the Sabbath. Accordingly, the court ruled that the plaintiff had not shown that Triumph fired her for failing to comply with a requirement of her employment that conflicted with a bona fide religious belief.

Moreover, the court determined, Triumph had demonstrated that it had offered the plaintiff a reasonable accommodation to her religious practice when it permitted her to leave early enough each Friday to travel to her declared home in New Jersey to observe the Sabbath. Triumph showed that a 3:00 p.m. departure time was sufficiently early to give the plaintiff enough time to travel to her New Jersey home even in the heart of the winter. Triumph even offered to let the plaintiff work part-time if she did not want to work on Fridays, the court added.

Finally, the court found that Triumph also showed that accommodating the plaintiff’s request to leave hours earlier than the rest of her office staff would have imposed an undue hardship on Triumph, given that the plaintiff was a supervisor with significant responsibilities and a salary commensurate with those responsibilities. Triumph showed that the plaintiff’s absence from her office for hours every Friday “interfered substantially with the efficient operation of Triumph’s business,” the court concluded. [Waltzer v. Triumph Apparel Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14170 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2010).]

Employee Had Been Given “Ample Notice” Of Ability To Designate His Wife As Contingent Annuitant Under Retirement Income Plan, Court Rules

The plaintiff’s husband was an employee of Eastman Kodak Co. until his retirement in 1992. The plaintiff claimed that at the time of his retirement, the Kodak Retirement Income Plan and the plan trustees failed to provide him with the appropriate notification required by the plan’s terms of the full range of methods he could elect for the payment of retirement benefits. According to the plaintiff, this resulted in his electing a straight life annuity rather than a joint and survivor annuity, which would have entitled her to an annuity after his death. After her husband died, the plaintiff brought suit against the plan for benefits she claimed were due to her under the plan. The district court ruled in favor of the defendants, and the plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

The appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision. It found that the plaintiff had not refuted the “clear evidence in the record” that her husband had “ample notice both at the time of and after his retirement” of his ability to designate the plaintiff as a contingent annuitant under the plan, and of his ability to change the straight life annuity election he had made at his retirement. According to the appellate court, at the time of the plaintiff’s husband’s retirement, plan participants were given a fact sheet that “clearly indicated” that the plaintiff’s husband had the option of designating someone other than his then-spouse as his contingent annuitant, “clearly explained” the joint and survivor annuity option that would have allowed such a designation, and “clearly explained” that a plan participant could change the method of benefits payments that he had elected after retirement if he followed certain steps. Moreover, the appellate court continued, plaintiff’s husband acknowledged receiving such a fact sheet at his May 1992 meeting with a plan benefits counselor. The appellate court noted that the plaintiff pointed to no actual evidence in the record that would indicate that her husband had not received the fact sheet that contained the information she alleged had been withheld from him, and plaintiff did not contest the plan benefits counselor’s declaration that the fact sheet in the record was the one “provided to plan participants” at the time of her husband’s retirement.

Furthermore, the Second Circuit observed, it was undisputed that the plaintiff and her husband had received Kodak summary plan descriptions in 1995, 1998, and 2003, each of which provided detailed information regarding the options for receiving retirement benefits and the process required for the plaintiff’s husband to change the election he had made in 1992 in order to make the plaintiff his contingent annuitant. Thus, the appellate court found, the plaintiff’s husband had received all the information necessary to designate the plaintiff as his annuitant at any time after 1995. It concluded that the district court therefore had not erred in concluding that there was no material question of fact regarding the plaintiff’s entitlement to benefits or other rights under the plan, and that the district court’s award of summary judgment to the defendants on those claims should be affirmed. [Hall v. Kodak Retirement Income Plan, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 2108 (2d Cir. Feb. 1, 2010).]

Late Filing Dooms Company President’s Long Term Disability Insurance Benefits Claim

On September 13, 2002, the plaintiff in this case, the president and chief executive officer of MIA Transportation Services, Inc., apparently injured his spine while at work. In 2003, the plaintiff submitted a claim for long term disability insurance benefits. After allegedly receiving no response, he contacted the company and was told that it had no record of his claim. He resubmitted his claim on May 3, 2003.

On September 9, 2003, the plan administrator acknowledged receipt of the plaintiff’s claim for long term disability benefits with a letter that stated that it needed to receive a claim form “completed by [the plaintiff’s] employer” to complete review of his claim. The letter also included a copy of the company’s “Claim Review Procedures” and set forth the appeals process, specifically noting the plaintiff’s right to appeal within “180 days, following receipt of an adverse benefit determination.”

On September 11, 2003, the plan administrator sent the plaintiff a second letter, which requested that he complete the signed authorization form that had been previously sent to him, and notified him that it still had not received his employer’s claim form, which, as MIA’s president, the plaintiff could have completed himself. The letter stated that if after receiving these documents, the plan administrator determined that the plaintiff was “eligible” under the plan, it then would request medical records from his treating physicians. In addition, this letter extended the plaintiff’s deadline to file these two documents to 45 days from the plaintiff’s receipt of the letter.

Because the plaintiff did not submit the requested documents within the 45 day extension period, the plan administrator denied the plaintiff’s claim for disability in a letter dated October 31, 2003. The plaintiff later claimed that he had not received this letter, although he did admit receiving a certified letter from the plan administrator regarding his separate claim for a waiver of premium on March 28, 2004.  Although this letter did not specifically address his disability claim, it stated that he had failed to prove “Total Disability” “from any occupation for wage or profit because of sickness or injury.” The plaintiff also acknowledged receipt of a letter from the plan administrator, dated July 28, 2006, in response to his attorney’s request for information about the status of his long term disability claim. The letter stated that the plaintiff’s benefits had been denied and included a copy of the October 2003 denial letter, which set forth the plaintiff’s rights to appeal the adverse disability determination. Thereafter, the plaintiff maintained that he had not received notice of the denial of his disability claim until he received this letter in 2006.

On November 27, 2006, the plaintiff sued the defendants. The district court held that the action was barred because it was commenced beyond the three year limitations period provided by the plan. The plan included a provision that limited the time during which an insured could file a lawsuit to “3 years after the time proof of claim is required.”  It also provided that an insured must file a proof of claim “no later than 90 days after the end of the elimination period.”  The plan defined elimination period as “consecutive days of disability” running for 180 days and during which no benefit was payable.

The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, where he argued that his lawsuit was timely because the plan administrator had failed to deny his claim until 2006.  The circuit court rejected that argument, however, finding that any alleged misbehavior on the part of the defendants regarding the processing of the plaintiff’s claim was “inapposite to application of the contracted-to limitations period,” which, it said, depended not on the date the plaintiff’s disability claim was denied (an arguably disputed fact), but on the date the proof of claim was required (an undisputed fact). As the appellate court explained, the limitations provision in the plan was triggered on the date the proof of claim was required, which itself depended on the date on which the elimination period began. The elimination period began to run on September 13, 2002, the date on which the plaintiff alleged he was injured. Thus, his proof of claim was due on June 10, 2003, 90 days after the elimination period had ended on March 12, 2003. The Sixth Circuit then ruled that, even assuming all of the plaintiff’s contentions regarding the mis-processing of his claim were true, his lawsuit still was untimely filed on November 27, 2006, as the limitations period had expired on June 10, 2006.

The Sixth Circuit also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that “equitable tolling” should be applied in this case on the ground that the defendants had purposely obfuscated his claims process by falsely asserting they had not received his proof of claim, by requesting information he had previously sent to them, and by failing to deny his claim until 2006. The circuit court ruled that equitable tolling did not apply, finding that the plaintiff had failed to diligently pursue his claims, noting that he had waited for almost three years before inquiring through counsel about the status of his disability claim. [Longazel v. Fort Dearborn Life Ins. Co., 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 2006 (6th Cir. Jan. 28, 2010).]

Circuit Court Says Claim Alleging Violation Of ADA Prohibition Against Pre-Offer Medical Inquiries Can Go To Jury

In November 2005, Aerotek, a company that places temporary workers at Benchmark Electronics Huntsville, Inc. (BEHI), assigned the plaintiff to work at BEHI. The plaintiff worked as a “debug tech,” and his responsibilities included identifying problems with, repairing and testing electronic boards. At the time the plaintiff commenced his temporary position at BEHI, the company had a practice of screening temporary employees for potential permanent employment. If a supervisor believed that a temporary employee would meet BEHI’s needs, the supervisor would invite that employee to submit an application for employment and complete the necessary drug testing and background check. Usually, after a candidate had cleared both a background and drug test, human resources would extend the candidate an offer, unless the hiring manager instructed otherwise.

On May 19, 2006, the plaintiff submitted an application for permanent employment at the request of his supervisor. The plaintiff took a drug test, which came back positive. After he was informed of that result, the plaintiff responded that he had had epilepsy since he was two years old and that he took barbiturates pursuant to a prescription to control it. BEHI cleared the plaintiff’s drug test, but his supervisor, who had learned of the initial positive result, ultimately decided not to offer him the position and asked Aerotek not to return the plaintiff to BEHI. Aerotek subsequently informed the plaintiff that he would not be returning to BEHI because he had a performance and attitude problem and because he had been accused of threatening his supervisor. After Aerotek fired the plaintiff, he brought suit against BEHI, asserting, among other things, that the company had engaged in an improper medical inquiry in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. BEHI moved for summary judgment, and the district court ruled that because the plaintiff had “tested positive for barbiturates,” BEHI was authorized to ask him whether he “had a legitimate use for such medication.” The plaintiff appealed.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit explained that the ADA prohibits medical examinations and certain medical inquiries at the pre-employment offer stage. Under the applicable regulations, the appellate court continued, an employer may inquire into an applicant’s ability to perform job-related functions. As the Eleventh Circuit noted, in addition to allowing inquiries directed at an applicant’s ability to perform job-related functions, the ADA recognizes an exemption for drug tests, and employers may ask follow-up questions in response to a positive drug test. However, the circuit court continued, the regulations, coupled with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s guidelines, made clear that disability-related questions were prohibited.  The drug test exemption “should not conflict with the right of individuals who take drugs under medical supervision not to disclose their medical condition before a conditional offer of employment has been given.”

The circuit court found that the district court had correctly concluded that employers may conduct follow-up questioning in response to a positive drug test, but it then ruled that there were limits on this type of questioning. The circuit court pointed out that the plaintiff had testified that his supervisor had told him his drug test was positive, that the plaintiff had disclosed his prescription, that he then had been taken to his supervisor’s office where he answered questions about his medication, and that his supervisor had remained in the room during this interview. The circuit court explained that although BEHI could ask follow-up questions to ensure that the plaintiff’s positive drug test was due to a lawful prescription, a jury could find that these questions exceeded the scope of what was permitted, and that the supervisor’s presence in the room violated the ADA, especially considering the conflict between the plaintiff’s testimony – that to answer the questions he was forced to disclose the fact and extent of his epilepsy – and the supervisor’s testimony – that he never knew the plaintiff suffered from the condition. The circuit court concluded that a jury could infer that the supervisor’s presence in the room “was an intentional attempt likely to elicit information about a disability in violation of the ADA’s prohibition against pre-employment medical inquiries.” It ruled, therefore, that the district court should not have awarded summary judgment to BEHI on this claim and remanded the case to the district court. [Harrison v. Benchmark Electronics Huntsville, Inc., 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 632 (11th Cir. Jan. 11, 2010).]

Raise Given To Female Employee After She Complained She Was Paid Less Than A Male Colleague Does Not Bar Her Claim Under The Equal Pay Act

The plaintiff in this case was employed by South Broward Hospital District as a trauma surgeon beginning in November 2001. She had a compensation contract with South Broward that started her at $170,000 per year, and increased to $210,000, $220,000, and $235,000 for the following three years, respectively. A male colleague had a contract that also started at $170,000 per year, with increases to $200,000, $250,000, and $275,000 for the following three years, respectively. In July 2004, the plaintiff sent a memorandum to the Director of Trauma Services expressing concerns that her pay was not comparable to her male colleague’s.  

The plaintiff subsequently filed suit against South Broward on a variety of counts, including violation of the federal Equal Pay Act. South Broward moved for summary judgment.

South Broward argued that the plaintiff’s claim under the Equal Pay Act was unsupported and frivolous because she actually was paid more, not less, than comparable male employees. It pointed to one year in which the plaintiff was earning $300,000 per year, and her colleagues were making $275,000 and $215,000, and claimed that this fact defeated the plaintiff’s claim under the Equal Pay Act. The court, however, found this argument to be “disingenuous and an oversimplification of the facts.”

The court found that South Broward had raised the plaintiff’s salary after she had complained about disparate compensation. That act, the court found, did not render the plaintiff’s claim under the Equal Pay Act invalid if she had otherwise been paid less than a male employee for comparable work. Accordingly, it ruled that South Broward was not entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff’s Equal Pay Act claim. [Saridakis v. South Broward Hospital District, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 120246 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 28, 2009).]

Reprinted with permission from the March 2010 issue of the Employee Benefit Plan Review – From the Courts.  All rights reserved.

 

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