Part B News | Inside job: Use tech, common sense to repel employee ...

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systems are trained to distinguish between normal employee behavior and unusual activities "that are typical signs of insider threats, such as large data uploads, credential abuse or unusual access patterns," Moore explains.

"When irregular behavior is detected, it should be taken seriously as a possible attack," Moore says. "Various indicators of insider threats exist, and a crucial step in protecting against them is recognizing those signs and establishing a threshold of normal [behavior] for employees."

Alternately, you might employ a strict Zero Trust security strategy. This is not based on an analysis of employee behavior after the fact, explains Julie Preiss, chief marketing officer with Appgate in Miami, Fla. Rather, it is a system that doles out access based on "pre-determined policies you 'program' into the solution." The employee's clearance is limited and continuously evaluated to see whether it needs to change based on new factors, such as roles the employee has taken on or abandoned in the organization.

"Trust is not implied simply because you're a known user like an employee," Preiss says. "Access is explicit, conditional and continuously monitored for change."

For example, "an employee of a health care company who works in sales should likely never have access to patient heath information records," Preiss explains. An IT worker may be given access to a Help Desk system in order to fix a problem,

but once that ticket is closed, access is automatically withdrawn. "If the employee went rogue, the amount of damage they could do is limited," Preiss says.

In such a system, when an employee is terminated, all their access can be removed at one quick stroke.

A further data protection step compatible with Zero Trust is tokenization, the practice of portraying information in the system as a token — that is, as meaningless text that appears in the place of sensitive data when unauthorized users access it.

According to Alex Pezold, CEO of TokenEx in Edmond, Okla., a familiar example of tokenization is seen in banking, where financial data is disguised in the system so that the multiple parties involved in a transaction cannot see it.

"When you process a payment using a token stored in your systems, only the original credit card tokenization system can swap the token with the corresponding primary account number, or PAN, and send it to the payment processor for authorization," Pezold says. "Your systems never record, transmit, or store the PAN — only the token."

## Two sets of eyes

If this seems a little extreme for your purposes, some simpler precautions based on pre-technological security models might do.

You may want to lean on "a security principle called separation of duties," says Mark Kirstein, vice president, customer success at Cosant Cyber Security in Tempe, Ariz. "All that means is, when you're looking at how your team's activities and access are provisioned and how they're going to operate on a regular basis, you want to have a very deliberate separation so that there's more than one person involved in various aspects of the job."

The principle is seen in corporate and financial activities that require two pairs of eyes to ensure process integrity, such as a corporate accountant who might be required to report to someone besides his boss, Kirstein says. Similarly, if you're giving an employee elevated administrative rights to a database, requiring that two people be involved in the job "makes the execution of anything nefarious or improper much more risky for any one person to try — because they know that, in order to do this, they need the other person's consent," Kirstein adds.

In fact, the second party doesn't even need to be heavily involved in the assignment — just so long as they're present so each of the parties can vouch for the other.

## 3 more internal-threat thwarters

- Use shared drives with segregated folders. Data hostage situations rely on a bad actor's access to other people's work. But simply having a shared work drive with separate folders for each employee reduces their chances, says Terry Bazemore Jr., principal cyber tester and COO of Ey3 Technologies in Upper Marlboro, Md. "The user would have read/write access to their own individual folder for saving the data to the shared drive, but not have access to anyone else's folder on the drive," Bazemore says. And the whole drive would be regularly saved making it extremely difficult for a rogue employee to cause trouble even by wiping their own work.
- Check the audit trails. All your network processes, including your electronic health record (EHR), probably have
  audit trails that give a record of all accesses and actions. (If you're not sure they do, you should check.) Some will
  have built-in filters that can quickly show when, for example, data movements, deletions or other types of activity
  have taken place. Gary Salman, CEO of Black Talon Security in Katonah, N.Y., recommends you review these
  trails at least once a month to see if anyone's doing something suspicious.
- Use a password management tool. Also known as password managers, these tools give employees a way to sign into several accounts with a single password. In addition to being convenient, this also assures that employees never learn the actual passwords to sensitive accounts, such as your payers'. If you're not using one, Salman suggests that you start and if you do have one, considering extending its use so that your employees have fewer opportunities to get in when they're not supposed to.

## Resources

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- Careers Info Security, "Inside Job: Former Worker Allegedly Holds Records for Ransom," Oct. 9, 2020: www.careersinfosecurity.com/inside-iob-former-worker-allegedly-holds-records-for-ransom-a-15146
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