Mere Insinuation of Negligence in Civil Complaint Did Not Transform Intentional Torts into Something “Accidental,” Ohio District Court Decides

April 30, 2015

A federal district court in Ohio has granted summary judgment in favor of an insurance carrier, reasoning that the mere “insinuation” of negligence in a civil complaint could not transform what essentially were intentional torts into something “accidental” that might be covered by a homeowner’s insurance policy.

The Case

After Andreas Sekic struck his brother-in-law Chris Ford in the head with a ceramic pot, Sekic was prosecuted and a jury convicted him of felonious assault. Sekic was sentenced to two years in prison.

Ford sued Sekic for damages and Sekic’s homeowner’s insurance carrier, Standard Fire Insurance Company, denied coverage for the incident. Standard reasoned that its personal liability coverage only applied to accidental bodily injury and did not apply to bodily injury that was expected or intended. Here, Standard pointed out, Sekic had been tried and convicted for felonious assault, an intentional act, and Ford’s alleged damages were the result of Sekic’s violation of a criminal law.

Ford’s civil case was tried to a judge. Sekic asserted that he had thrown the pot out of self-defense; that he had meant no harm; and that throwing the pot “was just an erratic, spur of the moment, defending myself kind of thing.” The judge concluded that Sekic had been negligent in causing Ford’s injuries and found against Sekic in the amount of $32,215.25, the cost of Ford’s medical bills.

Sekic subsequently consented to judgment for that amount plus $50,000 in non-economic damages. In doing so, Sekic “assign[ed] any and all rights and claims he may have against The Standard Fire Insurance Company, to Plaintiff Chris Ford.”

Ford then brought an action against Standard, which moved for summary judgment.

The Court’s Decision

The court granted Standard’s motion.

In its decision, the court explained that courts applying Ohio law have “roundly rejected the notion” that an insurer necessarily owed coverage to an insured convicted of a crime with “knowingly” as an intent element. In fact, the court continued, all Ohio courts that have specifically addressed the issue have held that a criminal conviction, in and of itself, could establish intent for the purposes of applying an intentional-acts exclusion in an insurance policy when the insurance company moved for summary judgment on that issue.

The court said that although it was true that Sekic had been convicted of felonious assault and not aggravated assault, the distinction was “immaterial” as both required the same mens rea of “knowingly.”

The court declared that the mere insinuation of negligence in a civil complaint could not transform what essentially were intentional torts into something “accidental” that might be covered by insurance. Simply stated, it concluded, liability insurance was “not a shield against liability for intentional and criminal conduct.”

The case is Ford v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., No. 1:14 CV 2089 (N.D. Ohio April 30, 2015).

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  • Robert Tugander





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