District Attorney’s Allegedly Defamatory Campaign Statements Were Not an “Occurrence,” California Court Decides

January 31, 2015 | Insurance Coverage

A federal district court in California has ruled that a homeowner’s insurance policy did not provide coverage for a defamation action against the insured ? a district attorney who was running for re-election ? for intentional statements that she had made or had authorized during her campaign.

The Case

After Meredith Lintott’s campaign for re-election to the position of district attorney for Mendocino County, California, was over, she was sued by an individual who alleged that he had been defamed by statements in three radio advertisements that she had “prepared” and had “approved” and comments that she had made in a debate. The plaintiff in the defamation case asserted four claims against Lintott:

  1. a defamation claim based on the radio advertisement;
  2. a defamation claim arising out of comments Lintott made during the debate;
  3. intentional infliction of emotional distress;and
  4. negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Lintott’s homeowner’s insurance carrier went to court for a declaration that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify her in the defamation action because the statements that occasioned the defamation action were not the result of an “occurrence,” which was defined in the policy as an “accident.”

The insurer moved for summary judgment.

The Court’s Decision

The court granted the insurer’s motion for summary judgment, finding that neither the potential for coverage nor coverage was present with respect to the claims asserted against Lintott in the defamation action.

In its decision, the court found that there was “no reasonable argument” that Lintott’s statements concerning the plaintiff in the defamation action had been “accidental.” The court pointed out that Lintott had admitted that she had made the statements on more than one occasion and that she had approved of their dissemination on the radio during her re-election campaign. Moreover, the court continued, Lintott had researched andauthored the allegedly defamatory statements, had admitted that the statements had been “based upon my personal knowledge and inquiry regarding” the plaintiff in the defamation action, and had admitted that she specifically had “prepared” and “approved” the content of the radio advertisements.

Therefore, the court ruled, “no reasonable factfinder” could determine that the statements were accidental. The court added that Lintott’s statement that she had believed the statements to be true and that she had not intended to cause harm to the plaintiff in the defamation action was “of no moment” because her subjective intent was “irrelevant” in determining whether her actions constituted an “accident.”

Significantly, the court continued, the complaint in the defamation action alleged “intentional defamation.” It found Lintott’s statements “were not unintentional, unexpected acts” and, therefore, did not qualify as an “accident” even if Lintott had not intended them to be false or had not intended the alleged harm.

The case is Grange Ins. Ass’n v. Lintott, No.: 11-CV-6419 YGR (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2015).

Share this article:

Related Publications


Get legal updates and news delivered to your inbox